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BANKING-DISCLOSURE OF RECORDS-THE DUTY OF A BANK
To CUSTOMER INFORMATION-The lawyer who attempts to
advise a bank on its duty as to the disclosure of information it has
received concerning its customers, including communications from
the customer himself, enters a puzzling area of the law. The difficulty is not primarily a conceptual one but rather a surprising
scarcity of American authority clearly defining the duty, an inadequate amount of legal literature in the area,1 and a lack of
consistent treatment of customer information by banks. One can
only speculate on the cause of the scarcity of authority, but certainly the traditionally conservative treatment given customer
information by American bankers and the use of extralegal rules2
to guide bankers on certain aspects of its duty regarding this information at least partially explain the doctrinal void. Another
factor is the tendency of courts to approach this problem
obliquely-as a question of whether a banker has a testimonial
privilege to refuse to reveal information concerning his customers
when ordered to do so by a court3 or governmental agency4which has resulted in the development of a relatively substantial
body of case law detailing instances when a bank may not refuse
to disclose information, and a marked absence of any definitive
statement on the other, more positive, aspects of the duty itself.
A final possible reason for the scarcity of authority is a lack
of recognition of the legal implications of the bank-depositor relationship despite increased awareness of the importance of an
individual's credit standing in our present economic framework.
AS

1 The only two adequate discussions of the area may be found in l PATON'S DIGEST
OF LEGAL OPINIONS § 19 (4th ed. 1940) and Limburg, The Bankers' and Brokers' Privilege, 25 COLUM. L. REv. 152 (1925).
2 See, e.g., Robert Morris Associates Code of Ethics for the Exchange of Information.
A code of credit ethics adopted in 1916 by The Robert Morris Associates dedicated to
maintaining the exchange of credit information on a highly confidential and ethical
level, the code is voluntarily subscribed to by a large number of banks and savings
institutions.
3 See, e.g., Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v.
McGranery, Ill F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953).
4 See, e.g., ICC v. Harriman, 157 Fed. 432 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1908).
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The purpose of this comment, therefore, is to describe the
scope of the banker's duty as to customer information as best it
can be discerned in light of the increasing exchange of credit
information and increasing resort to such information by government agencies-particularly the Internal Revenue Service. In the
process, it is hoped that attention will be drawn to the uncertainty
which exists in this area, perhaps prompting action by the states
or the banks themselves to clarify the scope of the duty and to
encourage uniform treatment of customer information in a manner consistent with this duty.

The Duty Owed by a Bank to Its Customers
Three possible bases have been suggested for imposing upon
a bank the duty of secrecy as to customer information or, stated
conversely, for giving the customer a privilege of non-disclosure.
An early American case based its finding of such a duty on the
theory that the customer held a property interest in the information contained in the bank's records of his accounts, deposits, and
withdrawals. 5 Presumably because of the more acceptable basis
discussed below, this proprietary analysis has received no additional support. Secondly, it has been suggested that any communication from customer to bank be regarded as privileged,6
much as is a communication between attorney and client. Although this suggestion will be discussed more thoroughly below,
it will suffice here to point out that it has been consistently rejected by American courts. 7 The third theory, accepted by those
American writers who have considered the problem, is that first
announced in the leading English case of Tournier v. National
Provincial & Union Bank of England. 8
The rather complex fact situation of this important case may
be summarized as follows. Plaintiff was an overdrawn depositor
of defendant bank who had fallen behind in his payments to cover
his deficiency. While employed by K company he received a
check drawn by X, another of defendant's customers. Plaintiff
endorsed this check to L, who deposited it in his own bank. On
the return of the check, the defendant bank inquired of the last
Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34: (1929).
1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 620.
See, e.g., Smith v. Dawson, 234 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921).
s (1924] 1 K.B. 461.
5
6
7
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named bank as to who had deposited the check. Upon learning
that L was a bookie, the defendant bank unsolicitedly disclosed
this fact to plaintiff's employer. When plaintiff's employment
contract ended, K company refused to renew it, and plaintiff
brought an action at law for damages. On plaintiff's cause of action9 for breach of defendant's duty not to disclose to any third person either the state of plaintiff's account or any information the
defendant had acquired regarding the plaintiff, the jury found
for defendant. 10 The court of appeals reversed, holding that as a
matter of law the obligation of secrecy was an implied term of the
contract between the bank and its depositor.
The English court's finding of an implied contractual duty of
secrecy seems to have been based on the confidential relationship
then existing between the bank and its customer,11 an analysis of
dubious applicability to American banking because of the general
disagreement among our courts on the question of the confidentiality of the banker-customer relationship. Authorities range
from the view that the relationship itself is no more than that
of debtor-creditor, and therefore not confidential,12 to the belief
that the relationship itself, like that of lawyer and client, is confidential.13 While some banker-customer relationships fall within
the confidential area, the vast majority, in which the average
depositor thinks of the bank merely as a safe place in which to
keep his money, do not. 14 The more realistic approach, therefore,
is to recognize that the duty itself need not depend upon the
existence of a confidential relationship and can be more accurately thought of as a product of the confidence customarily ac9 Plaintiff also brought an action for slander with which we are not here concerned.
Toumier v. National Provincial &: Union Bank of England, supra note 8, at 462.
10 The jury had been instructed that if the "banker has made that disclosure justifiably, that is to say, if, under the circumstances of the particular case, it was reasonable and proper that he should make the communication, then there is no breach of
contract on his part." Id. at 471. Bankes, L. J., said in speaking of the instruction, "it
is leaving to the jury a question which is primarily a question for the judge, and ..•
it leaves the jury entirely without instruction as to what the circumstances are which
they are entitled to take into consideration in arriving at a conclusion as to what is
reasonable and what is proper." Id. at 472.
11 Id. at 464.
12 See, e.g., Klatt v. First State Bank, 206 Iowa 252, 220 N.W. 318 (1928). See also
5A MICHIE, BANKS AND BANKING 12, 15 (1950).
13 See, e.g., Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 146 Atl. 34 (1929); cf. Hansen, Internal
Revenue Examinations of Customers' Accounts, 73 BANKING L.J. 163, 164 (1956).
14 Limburg, supra note 1, at 157.
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corded such information by bankers.15 In any event, a difference
of opinion over the basis of the duty need not detract from the
aid given by T ournier to an understanding of its scope.
The English court, cognizant of the need to balance the customer's need for privacy in order to protect his credit standing
with the need of banks and the economy in general for a certain
amount of interchange of credit information and the public need
for disclosure of customer information in such areas 4s tax investigation, qualified its general statement of legal duty with four
broad exceptions: "(a)Where disclosure is under compulsion by
law; (b) Where there is a duty to the public to disclose; ( c) Where
the interests of the bank require disclosure; (d) Where the disclosure is made by the express or implied consent of the customer."16
Although Tournier has been criticized for its failure to define
more clearly the duty owed, it having been said that the court
merely stated "but an implication qualified by other implications,"17 the case nevertheless gives English banking law a degree
of certainty in this area that its American counterpart lacks. As
a result, in the absence of applicable American authority, some
writers have concluded that Tournier states the law as it would
be found to exist by an American court.18 No case has clearly so
held, nor has the writer come across any case clearly raising the
issue, but this assumption seems fairly reasonable, in view of the
customary confidential treatment given by American banks to
customer information, the need in our credit-conscious economy
for protection of an individual's credit, and other instances of the
use of English decisions to guide American courts.19 Therefore,
by drawing from Tournier and certain American authority which
delineate areas in which a bank clearly cannot withhold customer
information,20 it is possible to sketch in the scope of an American
bank's duty as to customer information. The very sources used,
however, evidence the uncertainty which attends the law in this
area and highlights the need for more authoritative statements
of this duty.
15 See Limburg, supra note I, at 157-58 for a discussion of the logic of deriving this
duty from custom.
16 Toumier v. National Provincial Se Union Bank of England, [1924] I K.B. 461, 473.
11 40 L.Q. REv. 278, 279 (1924).
18 See commentaries cited note I supra.
19 See, e.g., The Turret Crown, 297 Fed. 766, 776-77 (2d Cir. 1924).
20 See cases cited notes 3 and 4 supra.
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Disclosure in the Absence of Subpoena
When Consent Has Been Given: There is little doubt that a
state bank has the power to disclose general information regarding the credit position of a depositor if the customer has consented.21 The practice is general and is in fact a necessity in
today's complex credit economy. As the duty of secrecy is a contractual relation, ad hoc consent is merely a form of waiver releasing the bank from any obligation to refrain from disclosing
the requested information.22 However, if the consent is given at
the time the relationship is born, the consent would be evidence
from which to infer that no obligation ever existed and therefore
no release would be necessary. There is some doubt as to the right
of a national bank to give such information because of a somewhat questionable holding by a state court that "a national bank
has no power to engage in the business of furnishing to depositors
... [such information]."23 Clearly inapplicable to the occasional
rendering of such infonnation, which could not be deemed to be
"engaging in the business of furnishing" information, this case
is unlikely to be found applicable even where a continuous practice of rendering such information was found. The furnishing
of credit information by banks has become so widespread there is
little doubt that it would be deemed an implied power of a national bank. But the case has never been specifically overruled
and is still occasionally cited for the proposition that a national
bank lacks the power to furnish credit information.
Somewhat related to the consideration of the power of a bank
to furnish credit information with the customer's consent is the
question of whether the furnishing of such information is within
the scope of the bank's duties. It appears that there is no legal
obligation on the bank to disclose information.24 For business
21 E.g., Hindman v. First Nat'! Bank, 98 Fed. 562, 567 (6th Cir. 1899): "It is the
usual practice for depositors and customers of a bank to refer others to the bank for
information as to their financial responsibility. To give such information to third persons or to the public at the instance of the customer or depositor is certainly not
beyond the scope of banking powers." Cf. Comment, 31 MARQ. L. REv. 97 (1947).
22 This is an example of what was meant by the fourth exception to the banker's
duty stated in Toumier. See note 16 supra.
23 People's Nat'! Bank v. Southern States Fin. Co., 192 N.C. 69, 77, 133 S.E. 415,
422 (1926). But see 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 627.
24 Cf. Lemke v. First Nat'! Bank, 190 Wis. 223, 208 N.W. 946 (1926); Consolidated
Milling Co. v. Fogo, 104 Wis. 92, 80 N.W. 103 (1899); Comment, 31 MARQ. L. REv.
97, 100 (1947).
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reasons it is unlikely that the bank would refuse to supply the
requested information, but generally no one, not even the customer himself,25 can, without the aid of a subpoena, demand that
it be given. However, as the duty of secrecy is based only upon
an implied agreement, it appears that the bank and customer
could specifically agree to the furnishing of certain information
to third parties.
Somewhere between the questions of the bank's power and its
duty to disclose information is the question of its liability vel non
for disclosure of erroneous or misleading customer information,
upon which third parties have relied to their detriment.26 The
answer usually depends to a great extent upon the particular fact
situation, but generally an employee (especially a cashier) cannot,
merely by virtue of his position with the bank, make the bank
liable for his having given such information.27 Even if it is shown
that the bank has a customary practice of furnishing such information, liability will not be imposed unless it can be shown also
that the bank's misrepresensation was intentional,28 or unless the
bank can be proved to have later discovered its error, and then
knowingly received benefits from the giving of the information.29
When No Consent Has Been Given: It is important to determine how long the obligation of silence continues and to what
information it should apply. Only Tournier has spoken on these
points and there the judges agreed that the contractual obligation
did not have a retroactive scope and therefore did not extend to
information received prior to the creation of the banker-customer
relationship, but that it did apply after the termination of the
relationship to information received during its existence.30 The
court split on whether the duty extended to information received
through another customer's account but during the existence of
25 It is clear the relationship between banker and customer, whatever else it might
be, is not that of principal and agent. As to the dispute on the actual nature of this
relationship, see authorities cited in notes 11 and 12 supra.
2i3 See cases collected in Annot., 48 A.L.R. 528 (1927). See also Comment, 31 MARQ.
L. REv. 97 (1947).
27 See, e.g., Taylor v. Commercial Bank, 174 N.Y. 181, 66 N.E. 726 (1903). See also
1 PATON, op. cit. supra note I, at 629.
28 See, e.g., Park 8e Tilford Import Corp. v. Passaic Nat'l Bank 8e Trust Co., 129
N.J.L. 436, 30 A.2d 24 (1943); cf. Hindman v. First Nat'I Bank, 112 Fed. 931 {6th Cir.
1902). See also 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 629.
29 See Martin v. Gotham Nat'l -Bank, 211 N.Y.S. 828 (Sup. Ct. 1925). But see
Shriver v. Fourth Nat'! Bank, 121 Kan. 388, 247 Pac. 443 (1926).
30 Tournier v. National Provincial 8e Union Bank of England, [1924] 1 K.B. 461, 481.

•

1962]

COMMENTS

787

plaintiff's. Lord Justice Scrutton felt that although the disclosure
was a breach of defendant's duty to the drawer of the check, it
was not a breach as to plaintiff.31 The majority adopted as its
test whether the information had been received during the currency of plaintiff's account and in defendant's role as banker.32
Arguably this is an unwarranted extension of the bank's duty,
as the information was not received by the bank in its role as
plaintiff's banker. However, it was certainly only because of its
role as plaintiff's banker that defendant had any interest in the
information received through the drawer of the check's account
and passed the information to his employer. Therefore the extension seems justified on the facts of this case. And after balancing the importance of personal credit with the many exceptions
already stated to the general duty of secrecy, it appears that this
broader duty is a legitimate and welcome extension of the scope
of the customer's protection.
A bank may be compelled to reveal information concerning
its customers even in the absence of a subpoena, but only in
certain limited instances. The most obvious of these exceptions
to the duty of secrecy is the bank stockholder's right to investigate
the bank's books. 33 In reference to the duty found in Tournier,
one court said:
"A bank's contract with a customer not to disclose information concerning his transactions with it cannot override the
rule of law giving stockholders of the bank a right to inspect
its books and records." 84
The right of a shareholder to inspect a bank's books has been
abolished by statute in some jurisdictions,35 but generally such
right exists, safeguarded by a certain amount of discretion in the
court to refuse inspection if the good faith or motive of the shareholder are questionable.36 Although the shareholder has this right,
the fact that the inquiry is made by another customer of the ,bank
s1 Id. at 482.
32 Id. at 474, 485; see Winslow, Banker's Duty of Secrecy, 32 CASE & CoM. 8 (1926);
76

J. 120 (1932).

SOL.
33 See

Guthrie v. Harkness, 199 U.S. 148 (1905).
State ex rel. G. M. Gustafson Co. v. Crookston Trust Co., 222 Minn. 17, 23-24, 22
N.W .2d 911, 916-17 (1946).
311 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 5-1035 (1947).
36 Cf. Bank Shareholder's Right of Inspection, 25 BANKING L.J. 17, 22 (1908).
34
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is not a relevant factor in determining when a bank may be compelled to reveal information.37
In certain instances there may exist a special relationship between the bank and inquirer which would require the bank to
reveal information concerning one of its customers. An example
is the situation where the inquirer is another bank, for whom the
depositor's bank becomes a collection agent. In this instance, the
bank has the duty in the absence of a subpoena to furnish the
information about the activities or affairs of its customers. 38 This
seems to be a legitimate exception to the contractual duty of
secrecy because of prevailing business practices and the need to
afford special protection in this limited number of special relationships.
If a bank discloses information in violation of its duty of secrecy, it theoretically exposes itself to liability for all damages
directly resulting from its breach of duty. 39 However, in the majority of cases recovery would be limited to nominal damages
because of the customer's difficult burden of showing actual financial damage.40 The defenses available to the bank for its breach
of duty are the same ones discussed above regarding liability for
misrepresentation to third persons, i.e., that the disclosure was
beyond the scope of the bank's power or beyond the scope of the
employee's duty. As was mentioned earlier, this first defense is
probably no longer available because of the generally recognized
power of a bank to give this information.41 The second is largely
a matter to be determined from the facts of each individual case.
Apart from the possibility of a contractual liability for breach
of the non-disclosure obligation, the bank may also subject itself
to a suit for libel or slander by the offended customer.42 Truth,
of course, is a complete defense to such an action,43 and the bank
s7.,see, e.g., People's Nat'l Bank v. Southern States Fin. Co., 192 N.C. 69, 133
S.E. 415 (1926).
38 Grant County Deposit Bank v. Greene, 200 F.2d 835 (6th Cir. 1952).
39 Cf. Brex v. Smith, 104 N.J. Eq. 386, 392, 146 Atl. 34, 37 (1929).
4-0 See 1 PATON, op. cit. supra note 1, at 619.
41 It is clearly within the power of state banks to give this information and almost
as clearly within the power of national banks. See authorities cited in notes 21 and 23
supra.
42 Cf. Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 127 Pac. 533 (1912); Lewis & Herrick v.
Chapman, 16 N.Y. 369 (1857).
43 See, e.g., Pennington v. Little, 266 Ky. 750, 99 S.W.2d 776 (1936). See generally
33 AM. JuR., Libel & Slander §§ 117, 119 (1941).
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is further protected by a qualified privilege of confidential communications, available when the information has been given in
good faith to one having an interest in the information sought.44
An example of the application of the latter defense is the case
where in response to a telephoned request from another bank the
defendant bank stated mistakenly that plaintiff had no account
with it. Having spoken in good faith to another bank, defendant
bank was protected from liability by its qualified privilege.45 However, if the inquirer has no legitimate interest in the information
sought, the bank will be liable in libel or slander for even a good
faith disclosure of erroneous information.

Disclosure in Response to Subpoena
A bank cannot invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
to justify refusing to disclose information when properly subpoenaed.46 Nor is there any authority which indicates bank records are privileged communications free from the reach of subpoena.47 On the contrary, the writers draw a clear distinction
between privilege, meaning freedom from testimonial compulsion-in the lawyer-client type of communication-and the socalled "qualified" privilege, meaning freedom from disclosure in
the absence of subpoena-in the banker-customer type of communication.48
It would be clearly unwarranted to extend the freedom from
testimonial compulsion to banker-customer communications. Such
an extension would be a clear violation of the balancing aspect of
Wigmore's famous test for the existence of such a privilege:
"The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
44 Cf. Richardson v. Gunby, 88 Kan. 47, 127 Pac. 533 (1912); Froslee v. Lund's State
Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915). See generally 33 AM. JuR., Libel & Slander
§ 170 (1941).
411 Rothholz v. Dunkle, 53 N.J.L. 438, 22 Atl. 193 (1891).
46 See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1943), and authorities cited therein. As
the privilege against self-incrimination is purely a personal privilege, it cannot be used
on behalf of a corporation.
47 The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect that bank records are
subject to subpoena by court order. See, e.g., In re Davies, 68 Kan. 791, 75 Pac. 1048
(1904); Smith v. Dawson, 234 S.W. 690 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921); Annot., 109 A.L.R. 1450
(1937).
48 See Limburg, supra note 1, at 152. On the privilege as to lawyer-client communications, see 8 WIGM0RE, EVIDENCE §§ 2290-2329 (McNaughton rev. 1961) and McCORMICK,
EVIDENCE §§ 91-100 (1954).
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of the communications must be greater than the benefit
thereby gained for the correct disposal of litigation."49
While the privilege as to lawyer-client communications rests
soundly upon the justifiable argument that encouragement of full
disclosure in this area benefits society,50 and would in fact be
discouraged without such a privilege, the social necessity for providing testimonial protection to a bank customer's communications is clearly outweighed by the harm such a barrier would do
to the fact-finding process in cases in which such information was
relevant, and the probability that absence of privilege will not
curtail the relationship. Admittedly it is from the rationale of
qualified privilege that many pressure groups have argued, some
successfully, for the creation of new statutory privileges.51 The
most closely related of these new privileges is that applied to
accountant-client communications now recognized in eleven states
and one territory.52 Arguably there is sufficient need to encourage
full disclosure to an accountant because of the need for competent
counseling in complex tax matters to justify this extension of
privilege. 53 By comparison, the extension of full privilege, as compared to a qualified form of privilege, to banker-customer communications is not warranted by any counter-balancing consideration and would be contrary to well-reasoned opinion against
further extension of testimonial privilege. 54
Nevertheless, the customer is legally entitled to some protec40 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 48, § 2285, at 527. The other parts of the test are
as follows: "(l) The communications must originate in confidence that they will not
be disclosed. (2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintainance of the relation between the parties. (3) The relation must be one
which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered."
50 WIGMORE, op. cit. supra note 48, § 2291. But even this privilege has been questioned. See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 48, § 91, at 182, "If one were legislating for
a new commonwealth, without history or customs, it would be hard to maintain that
a privilege for lawyer-client communications would facilitate more than it would obstruct the administration of justice."
51 See Note, 5 VAND. L. REv. 590, 601 (1952) where many of the new privileges, i.e.,
accountant-client, newspaper reporter-informant, are discussed.
52 For the most recent discussion of the accountant-client privilege, see Kasner,
Confidential Communications Between Accountant and Client, 6 DRAKE L. REv. 92 (1957).
Cf. Palmer v. Fisher, 228 F.2d 603 (7th Cir. 1955), in which a certified public accountant's
deposition, taken under authority of subpoena, as to his audit of corporation's books
was properly suppressed by an Illinois federal district court to enforce his privilege
under Illinois statute prohibiting a court from requiring a public accountant to divulge
information or evidence obtained by him in a confidential capacity.
53 This argument is made in Note, 32 TEXAS L. REv. 453, 455 (1954).
54 See McCORMICK, op. cit. supra note 48, § 81, at 166 n.7.
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tion even when a subpoena is used, and the bank should give him
this protection. It has been held that a banker may refuse to
disclose information concerning a customer's affairs to a public
official who fails to follow the proper procedure for securing such
information, 55 and, in a closely related area, that a stockbroker
need not reveal information not material to the issues under
investigation. 56 It would appear, in fact, that the banker has a
positive duty to refuse to reveal information under such circumstances. But where the proper procedures have been followed the
bank is bound to comply with the subpoena, and the customer,
who has no greater power in this respect than the bank, cannot
prevent compliance. 57 However, a situation may arise wherein
the customer can demand protection in the form of an injunction
to prevent wrongful disclosure. In one Third Circuit case58 an
injunction was granted to prevent a violation of the fourth amendment protection against "illegal search and seizure" where revenue agents demanding the customer's records from the bank had
failed to show cause for obtaining the records. Use of the case as
a precedent is weakened by the fact that the court later sustained
the subpoena after the Government justified its need to investigate the subpoenaed records, and approved, obiter, the rule that
a third party does not have standing to invoke the protection of
the fourth amendment. 59 However, in the proper situation, perhaps where the statutory prerequisites for securing a customer's
accounts have not been met, the doctrine of the earlier Third
Circuit decision may once again be found applicable.

Internal Revenue Investigations
A considerable number of cases have been decided on the relationship of a banker and his customer concerning information
55

See Hansen, Internal Revenue Examinations of Customers' Accounts, 73 BANKING

L.J. 163 (1956).

Jonau v. Ferrand, 3 Rob. (La.) 364 (1842).
Cf. McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937), where a broker's customer tried
to prevent the broker from complying with subpoena issued by the SEC on the grounds
that (1) broker-customer relations were privileged, and (2) compliance would constitute
an unreasonable search of the customer. Both grounds were rejected and the court
refused to extend testimonial privilege to broker-client communications.
llS Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
59 Zimmerman v. Wilson, 25 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1938), afj'd, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir.
1939). The "standing" rule in this context was first set forth in McMann v. SEC, 87
F.2d 377 (2d Cir. 1937).
G6

57
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held by the former demanded by Internal Revenue Service
agents.00 Clearly the Internal Revenue Service has the power to
subpoena customer records from a bank.61 That the bank will be
put to a certain amount of trouble in order to comply is no excuse
for refusal, for a bank, like all of society, has a duty to aid in the
enforcement of the law. 62 However, there exist certain well-organized limitations -On this power of inquiry. Before obtaining a
subpoena the revenue agent "must specify with sufficient precision for their identification the documents desired to be inspected.
His demands must be within the scope of the statute . . . [and]
he must also allege that such documents 'bear upon the matters
required to be included in the return' in question." 63 Where these
conditions have not been met, the bank owes a duty to its customers to refuse to furnish the requested documents. But in actual
practice, apparently, far less may suffice to secure the information
sought. From a study of several Los Angeles and New York banks
it appears many banks have no set procedure for dealing with
Internal Revenue requests for customer records.64 Some furnish
the desired information upon the mere showing of proper credentials while others require the agent to produce a subpoena
before releasing any customer information to him. 65 Even more
surprising than the unsystematic handling of requests for information is the fact that some banks do not attempt to notify customers
that their accounts are under subpoena while others, having no
set notice procedure, will notify only "important customers." 66
In order to be consistent with its duty to maintain the secrecy
of its customer's records in the absence of subpoena, a bank should,
at the very minimum (I) notify the customer of the investigation;
(2) prohibit inspection without a court order; (3) check the procedure followed by the agent and the order itself to assure compliance with the statutory requirements; and (4) adopt and follow
a uniform procedure for handling such requests. Such action on
the part of the bank might delay tax investigations, but for a
60

61

E.g., First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947).
INT. REv. CODE OF 1954 § 7602. See Note, 75 BANKING L.J. 9 (1958).

Washington Nat'! Bank v. Daily, 166 Ind. 631, 77 N.E. 53 (1906).
First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532, 534 (5th Cir. 1947).
64 Bailin, Banks Ordinarily Cooperate with Internal Revenue Service in Tax Examinations of Customers, 14 J. TAXATION 220 (1961).
65 Ibid.
66 Id. at 221.
62
63
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bank to do less than the above is clearly inconsistent with its duty
to its customers. If the procedure proves too great an interference
with tax investigations, Congress may always amend the Internal
Revenue Code. But it is not the role of a bank to determine the
degree of cooperation to which the Service is entitled at the
expense of the customer's privilege of non-disclosure.

State Statutes
A scattering of statutes pertaining to various aspects of the
bank-customer duty of secrecy can be found among the states.
Exemplary are a Montana statute67 revoking the shareholder's
right to inspect the books and records of a bank, and section 36(10)
of the New York Banking Law. The latter reads:
"All reports of examinations and investigations, correspondence and memoranda concerning or arising out of such
examination and investigations, including any duly authenticated copy or copies thereof in the possession of any banking
organization, bank holding company or any subsidiary
thereof . . . foreign banking corporation, licensed lender,
licensed casher of checks, or the savings and loan bank of the
state of New York or the banking department, shall be confidential communications, shall not be subject to subpoena
and shall not be made public unless, in the judgment of the
superintendent, the ends of justice and the public advantage
will be subserved by the publication thereof, in which event
he may publish or authorize the publication of a copy of any
such report or any part thereof in such manner as he may
deem proper." 68
In a recent case60 interpreting this language, the court upheld
immunity from subpoena by refusing to allow a letter from the
New York Department of Banks to a trust company to be introduced into evidence and by sustaining a decision of the Superintendent of Banking that there was no public advantage to be
gained by allowing the information to be disclosed. Since the
documents described in the statute are "confidential communications" and "not subject to subpoena," it would seem to follow that
5-1035 (1947).
N.Y. BANKING LAW § 36(10).
Clark v. Flynn, 9 App. Div. 2d 249, 193 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1959).

67 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §

68
60
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a bank could refuse to disclose them or their contents in the
absence of subpoena as well as under the directives of one.
No state has attempted to deal with the over-all problem by
enacting a comprehensive statement of the bank's duty to maintain the confidence of information received concerning its customers.
Foreign Law and the Duty of Secrecy
The most comprehensive and perhaps most familiar foreign
banking law is that of Switzerland. The banking secrecy aspect
of the Swiss law is but one of the so-called secrecy laws by which
the Swiss attempt to effectuate their notion that each individual is
entitled to a "sphere of secrecy (Geheimsphare)." One writer has
stated:
"The 'banking secret' has long been recognized as part of
such 'sphere of secrecy.' The banking secret is an obligation
of the banks or bankers not to disclose any information about
their clients which might come to their attention in the
course of their business.'' 70
A violation of the duty of secrecy was originally considered a tortious offense subjecting the violator to civil liability only. In
1934, however, this duty was made statutory71 and it was made a
crime for anyone to induce the disclosure, or for a bank to disclose
the confidential information given it by a customer. Article 47
of the Banking Act states:
"Whoever intentionally . . .
"(b) in his capacity as an officer or employee of a bank, or
as an auditor or his assistant, or as a member of the banking
commission, or as an officer or employee of its bureau, violates
his duty to observe silence or professional secrecy; or whoever
induces or attempts to induce a person to commit such an
offense, shall be fined not more than 20,000 Francs, or shall
be imprisoned for not longer than six months, or both ...."
Enacted originally to prevent foreign economic espionage in preWorld War II Europe, the Swiss law entitles the bank customer
70

Meyer, The Banking Secret and Economic Espionage in Switzerland, 23

GEO.

WASH. L. REV. 284, 288 (1955).
'l1 Bundesgesetz iiber die Banken und Sparkassen
SAMMLUNG DER BUNDESGESETZE UND VERORDNUNGEN 117.

(Vom 8. Nov. 1934) 51
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to a broad scope of protection, including protection from tax investigations. Moreover, since privileged communications are a
matter of cantonal rather than federal law, the banker's privilege
to refrain from testifying to customer information is not uniform.
Admittedly, the circumstances present in the United States are
not the same as those which prompted the Swiss to enact their
banking secrecy statute, and it would probably be unwise for the
United States to extend an exemption from testimonial compulsion to the banker. Certainly there is no need in the United
States for criminal sanctions to punish the breach of the banker's
duty.
A number of American cases have involved the secrecy aspect
of Swiss and other foreign banking laws. The Second Circuit in
two recent decisions has drawn an interesting distinction in the
foreign banking field on the effect of service of a subpoena by a
United States court. In the first case72 it was held that an American bank may be required by subpoena to produce records of its
Panamanian branch, while in the second73 it was held that the
domestic branch of a Canadian bank should not be served with a
subpoena requiring the production of records held by the parent.
In the latter case there was some question as to whether sending
the records out of Canada would violate Canadian law. The court,
concerned about a possible violation of its neighbor's laws, noted
that there were other devices, potentially less troublesome, available to secure the requested information and held that the subpoena should not have been issued. The court referred to its earlier decision in the case involving foreign branches of an American
bank where it had indicated that enforcement of the subpoena
would be qualified if Panamanian law prohibited compliance.
This concern over the possible violation of foreign banking
law and the effect of this concern on a subpoena issued in the
United States is an extension of the Supreme Court opinion in
Societe Internationale v. Rogers.74 In that case the district court
non-suited a plaintiff who was unable to bring certain banking
records out of Switzerland and into court without violating
Swiss law. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that where
plaintiff had done all that was possible to secure the records
72
73
74

First Nat'! City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1959).
Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960).
357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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short of violating Swiss law, he should at least be permitted to
proceed to trial although he was to be in no way relieved from his
burden of proof, which without the requested records might well
prove insurmountable. 75
Conclusion
The basic problem is, as has been stated before, uncertainty
regarding the exact posture of the law in the United States on this
question. Speculation and conjecture as to the probable applicability of the Tournier doctrine may be an interesting academic
exercise but it will not suffice to provide a solution. Nor will an
understanding of the cases which have held that no privilege from
disclosure existed provide the final answer. What is needed is a
positive statement of the bank's duty, either by statute or a selfregulatory banking code, which will properly balance certain relevant interests: (1) the bank customer's need for protection of his
credit; (2) the bank's commercial need to reveal customer information in certain situations; (3) the need of the economy for the
free flow of credit information; and (4) the public need for disclosure in certain important situations.
The foundation of any code must be the recognition of the
general primacy of the customer's need for privacy and protection of his credit. The need for protection of credit is, of course,
subordinate to the desirability of disclosure of credit information
to one, such as another bank, who has a legitimate interest in the
information. Unless there is present such commercial necessity,
or the express consent of the customer,76 or a validly obtained
subpoena, the bank should have the duty to refuse to disclose
any information obtained during the bank-customer relationship.
From these basic premises all other rules should follow.
It is apparent that the public interest is such that bank records
should not be placed beyond reach of subpoena by the enactment
of a privilege. Nevertheless, the bank should be obliged to adopt
a procedure for dealing with such demands which will give each
customer maximum protection. The customer should be notified
Id. at 198.
It may also be desirable to infer the customers consent when he has, in relevant
dealings with a potential creditor, informed that person of the identity of his bank.
In the absence of such an inference, the request for information (and consequently, in
all probability, the customer's request for credit) would be denied, to the detriment
of no one but the non-consenting customer.
75
76
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of the impending inspection, and the inspection request should
be refused unless consented to by the customer, or authorized by
a court or other body with the subpoena power. The bank should
further require a showing of full compliance with statutory or
judicially enunciated prerequisites for obtaining such information.
If a bank discloses information in breach of its duty, it should
be liable according to contract damage rules, compensating the
customer for all provable injuries resulting directly from breach,
as well as indirect injuries reasonably foreseeable at the time the
relationship was begun. The bank should also remain liable for
libel or slander when incorrect information has been given, subject still, however, to the qualified-privilege exception for information given in good faith to one having an interest in the information.
Whether a statute be enacted, judicial rules promulgated or a
private code adopted, some specific measures are needed to bring
greater clarity and uniformity to the treatment of customer information. The problem exists, and the basic doctrines and policies
are apparent. It remains only for the legislatures, the courts, or
the banks to coordinate them.
Robert B. Wessling, S.Ed.

